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Abstract
• Current eProcurement processes offer security 
against external attacks
• Information leak through procurement partners 
has increased over the recent years
• How can procurers and suppliers securely 
conduct their business transactions without 
revealing their confidential information? 
• Our approach: Perform computations involved 
in procurement using lightweight secure multi-
party computation (LSMC) techniques. Our framework 
Execution Time (s) by Procurer Bandwidth Usage (KB) by Procurer
Computing without Revealing: 
A Cryptographic Approach to eProcurement
Methods
• Design Goals for procuring commodity-
type products 
‒ Procurer need not reveal requirements to 
anyone
‒ Suppliers need not reveal item prices to anyone
‒ Procurer is able to “cherry pick” Suppliers with 
best prices for each individual requirement
‒ Payments are made through Payment Center (a 
trusted third party) who learns only payment 
info
‒ Payment Center does not learn about the 
context 
‒ Supplier(s) cannot be able to determine 










10 14.6 4.1 0.35
100 135.5 37.4 2.88
1000 1738.4 378 27.5









10 6.5 3.4 1.18
100 61.8 33.8 10.6
1000 614.2 342.7 105.9
10000 >5000 3425.3 1053.7
• Design Goals for specialized or custom 
products 
‒ Process enables Procurer to assess Supplier’s 
capabilities
‒ Process enables Procurer and Supplier(s) to  
negotiate a price with minimal disclosure of info
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Previous best Our approach
1. Hide inputs using additive splits
2. Compute over additive splits



















Previous best Our approach
PHE stands for Partial Homomorphic Encryption (Key length: 512 bits)
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